KANT: Immanuel Kant: Critique of Pure Reason

Immanuel Kant : Critique of Pure Reason
[Prefaces, Introduction, Transcendental Aesthetic]

From: Biographical note on Immanuel Kant, pg. v
He lectured on… the advantages to natural philosophy of a metaphysic connected with geometry.” At first he restricted himself to mathematics and physics, and that year and the next he published several scientific works, dealing with the different races of men, the nature of winds the causes of earthquakes, and the general theory of the heavens. … and gave every summer a popular course on physical geography.


From: Biographical note on Immanuel Kant, pg. v
Kant enjoyed great success as a lecturer; his style, which differed markedly from that of his books, was humorous and vivid, enlivened by many examples drawn from his wide reading in English and French literature, and in books of travel and geography, as well as in science and philosophy.



From: Biographical note on Immanuel Kant, pg. v
…homage did not interrupt Kant’s regular habits. … suffering from weak health, he maintained throughout his life a severe regiment. It was arranged with such regularity that people set their clocks according to this daily walk along the street named for him the Philosopher’s Walk. Until old age prevented him, he is said to have missed this regular appearance only on the occasion when Rousseeau’s Emile so engrossed him that for several days he stayed at home.

Kant wrote:
Time, was, when she was the queen of all the sciences; and if we take the will for the deed, she certainly deserves, so far as regards the high importance of her object-matter, this title of honor. Now it is the fashion of the time to heap contempt and scorn upon her; and the matron mourns, forlorn and forsaken, like Hecuba: “Modo maxima rerum, Tot generis, natisque potens…Nume trahor exul, inops.” ( But late on the pinnacle of fame, strong in my many sons…now exiled, penniless.)
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, preface, pg. 1


Kant wrote:
…the present work is not intended for popular use, that those devoted to science do not require such helps, although they are always acceptable, and that they would have materially interferred with my present purpose. Abbé Terrasson remarks with great justice that, if we estimate the size of a work, not from the number of its pages, but from the time which we require to make ourselves master of it, it may be said of many a book that it would be much shorter, if it were not so short.” ….many a book would have been much clearer, if it had not been intended to be so very clear. For explanations and examples, and other helps to intelligibility, aid us in the comprehension of parts, but they distract the attention, dissipate the mental power of the reader, and stand in the way of his forming a clear conception of the whole; as he cannot attain soon enough to a survey of the system, and the colouring and embellishments bestowed upon it prevent his observing its articulation or organizations which is the most important consideration with him, when he comes to judge of its unity and stability.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, preface, pg. 3


Kant wrote:
Still it is not to be supposed that it was as easy for this science [mathematics] to strike into, or rather to construct for itself, that royal road, as it was for logic, in which reason has only to deal with itself. On the contrary, I believe that it must have remained long – chiefly among the Egyptians – in the stage of the blind groping after its true aims and destination, and that it was revolutionized by the happy idea of one man, who struck out and determined for all time the path which this science must follow, and which admits of an indefinite advancement. The history of this intellectual revolution – much more important in its results than the discovery of the pass round the celebrated Cape of Good Hope – and of its author, has not been preserved. But Diogenes Laertius, in naming the supposed discoverer of some of the simplest elements of geometrical demonstration – elements which, according tot he ordinary opinion, do not even require to be proved – makes it apparent that the change introduced by the first indication of this new path, must have seemed of the utmost importance to the mathematicians of that age, and it was thus been secured against the chanced of oblivion. A new light must have flashed on the mind of the first man (Thales, or whatever may have been his name) who demonstrated the properties of the isosceles triangle. For he found that it was not sufficient to meditate on the figure, as it lay before his eyes, or the conception of it, as it existed in his mind, and thus endeavour to get at the knowledge of its properties, but that it was necessary to produce these properties, as it were, by a positive a priori construction; and that in order to arrive with certainty at a priori cognition, he must not attribute to the object any other properties than those which necessarily followed from that which he ah himself, in accordance with his conception, place in the object.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, preface, pg. 5

Immanuel Kant : Critique of Practical Reason

Kant wrote:
And this need is not a merely hypothetical one for the arbitrary purposes of speculation, that we must assume something if we wish in speculation to carry reason to its utmost limits, but it is a need which has the force of law to assume something without which that cannot be which we must inevitably set before us as the aim of our action.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Preface, pg. 291

Kant wrote:

They want to prove; very good, let them prove; and the critical philosophy lays its arms at their feet as the victors. As they then do not in fact choose to do so, probably because they cannot, we must take up these arms again in order to seek in the mortal use of reason and to base on this, the notions of God, freedom, and immortality, the possibility of which speculation cannot adequately prove.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Preface, pg. 292


Kant wrote:

This would not in other cases be in accordance with the systematic process by which a science is established, since matters which have been decided ought only to be cited and not again discussed. In this case, however, it was not only allowable but necessary, because reason is here considered in transition to a different use of these concepts from what it had made of them before
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Preface, pg. 292


Kant wrote:

I have also had regard to many of the objections which have reached me from men who show that they have at heart the discovery of the truth, and I shall continue to do so (for those who have only their old system before their eyes, and who have already settled what is to be approved or disapproved, do not desire any explanation which might stand in the way of their own private opinion.)
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Preface, pg. 293

Kant wrote:

To invent new words where the language has no lack of expression for given notions is a childish effort to distinguish oneself from the crowd, if not by new and true thoughts, yet by a new patches on the old garment.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Preface, pg. 293


Kant wrote:

Tell a man, for example that he must be industrious and thrifty in youth, in order that he may not want in old age; this is a correct and important practical precept of the will. But it is easy to see that in this case the will is directed to something else which it is presupposed that it desires; and as to this desire, we must leave it to the actor himself whether he looks forward to other resources than those of his own acquisition, or does not expect to be old, or think that in case of future necessity he will be able to make shift with little.

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 1. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason, pg. 297

Kant wrote:
This, for example, it is observed that we can find pleasure in the mere exercise of power, in the consciousness of our strength of mind in overcoming obstacles which are opposed to our designs, in the culture of our mental talents, etc.; and we justly call these more refined pleasures and enjoyment, because they are more in our power than others; they do not wear out, but rather increase the capacity for further enjoyment of them, and while they delight they are the same time cultivate.

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 1. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason, III Theorem II, pg. 299


Kant wrote:
Supposing that a will is free, to find the law which alone is competent to determine it necessarily.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 1. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason, VI. Problem II, pg. 302


Kant wrote:
Thus freedom and an unconditional practical law reciprocally imply each other.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 1. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason, VI. Problem II, pg. 302


Kant wrote:
Suppose someone asserts of his lustful appetite that, when the desired object and the opportunity are present, it is quite irresistible. [Ask him] if gallows were erected before the house where he find this opportunity, in order that he should be hanged thereon immediately after the gratification of his lust, whether he could not then control his passion; we need not be long in doubt what he would reply. Ask him, however – if his sovereign ordered him, on pain of the same immediate execution, to bear false witness against an honourable man, whom the prince might wish to destroy under a plausible pretext, would he consider it possible in that case to overcome his love of life, however great it may be. He would perhaps not venture to affirm whether he would do so or not, but he must unhesitatingly admit that it is possible to do so. He judge, therefore, that he can do a certain things because he is conscious that he out, and he recognize that he is free – a fact which but for the moral law he would never had known.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 1. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason, VI. Problem II, pg. 302


Kant wrote:
But I cannot assume the existence of this want in every rational being (not at all in God).
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 1. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason, VIII. Theorem IV, pg. 304


Kant wrote:
The direct opposite of the principle of morality is, when the principle of private happiness made the determining principle of the will, and with this is to be reckoned, as I have shown above, everything that places the determining principle which is to serve as a law, anywhere but in the legislative form of the maxim.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 1. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason, VIII. Theorem IV, pg. 304


Kant wrote:
Suppose that an acquaintance whom you otherwise liked were to attempt to fortify himself to you for having borne false witness, first by alleging the, in his view, sacred duty of consulting his own happiness; then by enumerating the advantages which he had gained thereby, pointing out the prudence he had shown in securing himself against detection, even by yourself, to whom he now reveals the secret, only in order that he may be able to deny it at any time; and suppose he were then to affirm, in all seriousness, that he has fulfilled a true human duty; you would either laugh in his face, or shrink back from him with disgust; and yet, if a man has regulated his principles of action solely with a view to his own advantage, you would have nothing whatever to object against this mode of proceeding.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 1. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason, VIII. Theorem IV, pg. 305




Kant wrote:

So sharply and clearly marked are the boundaries of morality and self-love that even the commonest eye cannot fail to distinguish whether a thing belongs to the one or the other.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 1. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason, VIII. Theorem IV, pg. 305


Kant wrote:

But to command morality under the name of duty is quite rational; for in the first place, not everyone is willing to obey its precepts if they oppose his inclinations; and as to the means of obeying this law, these need not in this case be taught, for in this respect whatever he wishes to do he can do.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 1. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason, VIII. Theorem IV, pg. 306



Kant wrote:

A man must first appreciate the importance of what we call duty, the authority of the moral law, and the immediate dignity which the following of it gives to the person in his own eyes, in order to feel that satisfaction in the consciousness of his conformity to it and the bitter remorse that accompanies the consciousness of its transgression. It is therefore, impossible to feel this satisfaction or dissatisfaction prior to the knowledge of obligation or to make it the basis of the latter.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 1. Of the Principles of Pure Practical Reason, VIII. Theorem IV, pg. 306


Kant wrote:

It is an old formula of the schools: Nihil appetium nisi sub ratione boni; Nihil aversamur nisi sub ratione mali, and it is used often correctly, but often also in a manner injurious to philosophy, because the expressions boni and moli are ambiguous, owing to the poverty of language, in consequence of which they admit a double sense, and therefore, inevitably bring the practical laws into ambiguity; and philosophy, which in employing them becomes aware of the different meaning in the same word, but can find no special expressions for them, is driven to subtile distinctions about which there is subsequently no unanimity, because the distinction could not directly marked by any suitable expression. The German language has the good fortune to possess expressions which do not allow this difference to be overlooked. It possess two very distinct concepts and especially distinct expression for that which the Latins express by a single word, bonum. For BONUM, it has DAS GUT [good], and DAS WOHL [well, weal], for MALUM, DAS BOSE [evil], and DAS UVEL [ill, bad], or DAS WEHL [woe]. So that we express two quite distinct judgments when we consider in an action the good and evil of it, or our weal and woe (ill).

Immanuel Kant, Crtique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 2. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason, pg. 315

Kant wrote:

However, then, men may laugh at the Stoic, who in the severest paroxysms of gout cried out: “pain, however thou tormentest me, I will never admit that thou art an evil (kakov, malum)”; he was right. A bad thing it certainly was, and his cry betrayed that; but that any evil attached to him thereby, this he had not reason whatever to admit, for pain did not in the least diminish the worth of his person, but only that of his condition. If he had been conscious of a single life, it would have lowered his pride, but pain served only to raise it, when he was conscious that he had not deserved it by any unrighteous action by which he had rendered himself worthy of punishment.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 2. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason, pg. 316

Kant wrote:

TABLE OF THE CATEGORIES OF FREDOM RELATIVELY TO THE NOTIONS OF GOOD AND EVIL

I QUANTITY

Subjective, according to the maxims

(practical options of the individual)

Objective, according to principles

(precepts)

A priori both objective and subjective principles of freedom

(laws)

II QUALITY

Practical rules of actions (praeceptivae)

Practical rules of omission (prohibitivae)

Practical rules of exceptions (exceptiveae)

III RELATION

To personality

To the condition of the person

Reciprocal, of one person to the conditions of the others

IV MODALITY

The Permitted and the Forbidden

Duty and the contrary to duty

Perfect and imperfect duty

Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 2. Of the Concept of an Object of Pure Practical Reason, pg. 319


Kant wrote:

What is essential in the moral worth of actions is that the moral law should directly determine the will. If the determination of the will takes place in conformity indeed to the moral lay, but only by means of a feeling, no matter of what kind which has to be presupposed in order that the law may be sufficient to determine the will, and therefore not for the sake of the law, then the action will possess legality, but not morality.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 3. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason, pg. 321



Kant wrote:

The negative effect on feeling (unpleasantness ) is pathological, like every influence on feeling and like every feeling generally.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 3. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason, pg. 323


Kant wrote:

For men and all created rational beings moral necessity is constraint, that is obligation, and every action based on it is to be conceived as a duty, not as a proceeding previously pleasing, or likely to be pleasing to us of our own accord. As if indeed we could ever bring it about that without respect for the law, which implied fear, or at least apprehension of transgression, we of ourselves, like the independent Deity, could ever come into possession of holiness of will by the coincidence of our will with the pure moral law becoming as it were part of our nature, never to be shaken (in which case the law would cease to be a command for us, as we could never be tempted to be untrue to it.)
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 3. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason, pg. 325



Kant wrote:

It can be nothing less than a power which elevates man above himself (as a part of the world of sense) , a power which connects him with an order of things that only the understanding can conceive, with a world which at the same time commands the whole sensible world, and with it the empirically determinable existence of man in time, as well as the sum total of all ends (which totality alone suits such unconditional practical laws as the moral). This power is nothing but personality, that is, freedom and independence on the mechanism of nature, yet, regarded also as a faculty of a being which is subject to special laws, namely, pure practical law given by its own reason; so that the person as belonging to the sensible world is subject to his own personality as belonging to the intelligible [supersensible] world. It is then not to be wondered at that man, as belonging to both worlds, must regard his own nature in reference to its second and highest characteristic only with reverence, and its laws with highest respect.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, First Part, Elements of Pure Practical Reason, Book I The Analytic of Pure Practical Reason, Chapter 3. Of the Motives of Pure Practical Reason, pg. 328


Kant wrote:

When we can bring any flattering thought of merit into our action, then the motive is already somewhat alloyed with self-love and has therefore some assistance from the side of the sensibility.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Second Part, Methodology of Pure Practical Reason,, pg. 359



Kant wrote:

Two things fill the mind with ever new and increasing admiration and awe, the oftener and the more steadily we reflect on them; the starry heavens above and the moral law within. I have not to search for them and conjecture them as though they were veiled in darkness or were in the transcendent region beyond my horizon; I see them before me and connect them directly with the consciousness of my existence.
Immanuel Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, Second Part, Methodology of Pure Practical Reason,, pg. 360