SPINOZA, Benedict de: Ethics

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics

QUOTES FOR DISCUSSION

From: Biographical note on Benedict de Spinoza

…he was solemnly excommunicated by the Jewish authorities for “abominable heresies which he practices and teaches.” Cut off form his own people, his parents dead, Spinoza was thrown on his own resources.

From: Biographical note on Benedict de Spinoza

In 1676, already seriously ill with the consumption which was to kill him, he received a visit from Leibnitz, with whom he had already corresponded on problems of optics, and they conversed “often and at great length.” Four months later, on a quiet Sunday afternoon in February, 1677, while the “people of the house” were at church, he died in the presence of an Amsterdam physician-friend. His funeral was “attended by many illustrious personages and followed by six coaches.” He was forty-four.

Spinoza wrote:
Prop. 8. Every substance is necessarily infinite. Demonst. Substance which has only one attribute cannot exist except as one substance (Prop. 5), and to the nature of this one substance it pertains to exist (Prop. 7). It must therefore from its nature exist as finite or infinite. But it cannot exist as finite substance, for (Def. 2) it must (if finite) be limited by another substance of the same nature, which also must necessarily exist (Prop. 7), and therefore would be two substances of the same attribute, which is absurd (Prop. 5).

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 1 Of God, Axioms, Great Books Vol. 31 

Prop. 11. God, or substance consisting of infinite attributes, each one of which expresses eternal and infinite essence, necessarily exists.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 1 Of God, Axioms, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 358

Prop. 13. Substance absolutely infinite is indivisible.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 1 Of God, Axioms, Great Books Vol. 31,pg. 359

Schol. There are those who imagine God to be like a man, composed of body and soul and suject to passions; but it is clear enough from what has already been demonstrated how far off men who believe this are from the true knowledge of God. But these I dismiss, for all men who have in any way looked into the divine nature deny that God is corporeal. That He cannot be so they conclusively prove by showing that by “body” we understand a certain quantity possessing length, breadth, and depth, limited by some fixed form. And that to attribute these to God, a being absolutely infinite, is the greatest absurdity. But yet at the same time, from other arguments by which they endeavour to confirm their proof, they clearly show that they remove altogether form the divine nature substance itself corporeal or extended, affirming that it was created by God. By what divine power, however, it could have been created they are altogether ignorant, so that it is clear they do not understand what they themselves say. But I have demonstrated, at least in my own opinion, with sufficient clearness (see Corol. Prop. 6 and Schol. 2, Prop. 8), that no substance can be produced or created by another being (ab alio). Moreover (Prop. 14), we have shown that besides God no substance can be nor can be conceived; and hence we have concluded that extended substance is one of the infinite attributes of God.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 1 Of God, Axioms, Great Books Vol. 31,pg. 360

Schol. There are some who think that God is a free cause because He can, as they think, bring about those things which we have said follow from His nature - that is to say, those things which are in His power - should not be, or should not be produced by Him. But this is simply saying that God could bring about that it should not follow from the nature of a triangle that is three angles should be equal to effect should not follow, which is absurd. But this proposition, that neither intellect nor will pertain to the nature of God.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 1 Of God, Axioms, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 362

I have now explained the nature of God and its properties. I have shown that He necessarily exists; that He is one God; that from the necessity alone of His own nature He is and acts; that He is, and in what way He is, the free cause of all things; that all things are in Him, and so depend upon Him that without Him they can neither be nor can be conceived; and finally, that all things have been predetermined by Him, not indeed form freedom of will or from absolute good pleasure, but form His absolute nature or infinite power.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 1 Of God, Appendix, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 369

This is the reason why each man has devised from himself, out of his own brain, a different mode of worshipping God, so that God might love him above others, and direct all nature to the service of his blind cupidity and insatiable avarice. Thus has this prejudice been turned into a superstition and has driven deep roots into the mind – a prejudice which was the reason why everyone has so eagerly tried to discover and explain the final causes of things.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 1 Of God, Appendix, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 370

Amidst so much in nature that is beneficial, not a few things must have been observed which are injurious, such as storms, earthquakes, diseases, and it was affirmed that these things happened either because the gods were angry because of wrong which had been inflicted on them by man, or because of sins committed in the method of worshipping them; and although experience daily contradicted this, and showed by an infinity of examples that both the beneficial and the injurious were indiscriminately bestowed on the pious and the impious, the inveterate prejudices on this point have not therefore been abandoned. For it was much easier for a man to place these things aside with others of the use of which he was ignorant, and thus retain his present and inborn state of ignorance, than to destroy the whole superstructures and thing out a new one. Hence it was looked upon as indisputable that the judgments of the gods far surpass our comprehension; and this opinion alone would have been sufficient to keep the human race in darkness to all eternity if mathematics, which does not deal with ends, but with the essences and properties of forms, had not place before us another rule of truth. In addition to mathematics, other causes also might be assigned, which it is superfluous here to enumerate, tending to make men reflect upon his universal prejudices, and leading them to a true knowledge of things.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 1 Of God, Appendix, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 370

If all things have followed from the necessity of the most perfect nature of God, how is it that so many imperfections have arisen in nature – corruption, for instance, of things till they stink; deformity, exciting disgust; confusion, evil, crime, &c? But as I have just observed, all this is easily answered. For the perfection of things is to be judged by their nature and power alone; nor are they more or less perfect because they delight or offend the human sense, or because they are beneficial or prejudicial to human nature. But to those who ask why God has not created all men in such a manner that they might be controlled by the dictates of reason alone, I give but this answer: Because to Him material was not wanting for the creation of everything, from the highest down to the very lowest grade of perfection; or, to speak more properly, because the laws of His nature were so ample that they sufficed to for the production of everything which can be conceived by an infinite intellect, as I have demonstrated in Prop. 166

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 1 Of God, Appendix, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 372

2. Man thinks.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 2 Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind, Axioms Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 373

Axiom 1. All bodies are either in a state of motion or rest.

Axiom 2. Every body moves, sometimes slowly, sometimes quickly.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 2 Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind, Axioms Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 378

Prop. 3. Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge, which inadequate, that is to say, mutilated and confused ideas involve.

Demonst. There is nothing positive in ideas which can constitute a from of falsity (Prop. 33. pt. 2). But falsity cannot consist in absolute privation (for we say that minds and not bodies err and are mistaken); nor can it consist in absolute ignorance, for to be ignorant and to be in error are different. Falsehood, therefore, consists in the privation of knowledge which is involved by inadequate knowledge of things or by inadequate and confused ideas. Q.E. D.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 2 Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind, Axioms Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 385

This doctrine, therefore, besides giving good repose in every way to the soul, has also this advantage, that it teaches us in what our highest happiness or blessedness consists, namely, in the knowledge of God alone, by which we are drawn to do those things only which love and piety persuade. Hence we clearly see how greatly those stray form the true estimation of virtue who expect to be distinguished by God with the highest regards and for virtue and the noblest actions as if for the completest servitude, just as if virtue itself and the service of God were not happiness itself and the highest liberty.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 2 Of the Nature and Origin of the Mind, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 394

With regard to the second point, I should say that human affairs would be much more happily conducted if it were equally in the power of men to be silent and to speak; but experience shows over and over again that there is nothing which men have less power over than the tongue, and that there is nothing which they are less able to do than to govern their appetites, so that many persons believe that we do those things only with freedom which we seek indifferently; as the desire for such things can easily be lessened by the recollection of another thing which we frequently call to mind; it being impossible, on the other had, to do those things with freedom which we seek with such ardour that he recollection of another thing is unable to mitigate it.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 3 On the Origin and Nature of the Affects, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 397

… whilst, in truth, they have no power to restrain the impulse which they have to speak, so that experience itself, no less than reason, clearly teaches that men believe themselves to be fee simply because they are conscious of their own actions, knowing nothing of the causes by which they are determined: it teaches, too, that the decrees of the mind are nothing but the appetites themselves, which different, therefore according to the different temper of the body.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 3 On the Origin and Nature of the Affects, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 397

For every man determines all things from his affect; those who are agitated by contrary affects do not know what they want, whilst those who are agitated by no affect are easily driven hither and thither.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 3 On the Origin and Nature of the Affects, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 398

When a man thinks too much of himself, this imagination is called pride, and is a kind of delirium, because he dreams with his eyes open, that he is able to do all those things to which he attains in imagination alone, regarding them therefore as realities, and rejoicing in them so long as he cannot imagine anything to exclude their existence and limit his power of action. Pride, therefore, is that joy which arises from a man’s thinking too much of himself. The joy which arises from thinking too much of another is called overestimation, and that which arises from thinking too little of another is called contempt.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 3 On the Origin and Nature of the Affects, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 404

Prop. 38. If a man has begun to hate a beloved thing so that his love to it is altogether destroyed, he will for this very reason hate it more than he would have done if he had never loved it, and his hatred will be in greater proportion to his previous love.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 3 On the Origin and Nature of the Affects, Great Books Vol. 31,pg. 408

Prop. 43. Hatred is increased through return of hatred, but may be destroyed by love.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 3 On the Origin and Nature of the Affects, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 409

Prop. 44. Hatred which is altogether overcome by love passes into love, and the love is therefore greater than if hatred had not preceded it.

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 3 On the Origin and Nature of the Affects, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 410

2. Joy is a man’s passage from a less to a greater perfection.

3. Sorrow is man’s passage from a greater to a less perfection.

Explanation. I say passage, for joy I not perfection itself. If man were born with the perfection to which he passes, he would posse it without the affect of joy;

Benedict de Spinoza: Ethics, Part 3 On the Origin and Nature of the Affects, Great Books Vol. 31, pg. 416